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LIST OF PARTIES
The parties in this action consist only of the former husband and wife to the
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The Appellant/Respondent is Beverly Sue Arnason.
The Appellee/Petitioner is Anthony David Arnason.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a decree of divorce and division of marital property in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County; the Honorable Frank G. Noel
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(h) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court's finding that inheritance funds had neither

been consumed nor lost their identity and are therefore separate and not marital
property was clearly erroneous when the inherited property was; (1) given to Mr.
Arnason individually, (2) by personal check written to him from his mother, (3)
placed in a separate personal bank account, and (4) used as a down payment on two
homes.
Standard of Review: This court reviews a trial court's findings of fact under a
"clearly erroneous" standard. See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52(a). Findings of fact are clearly
erroneous when they are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence or if this Court has a
firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 354
(Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted).
An appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings,
and then demonstrate why the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's
conclusions. See Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). If
Appellant does not marshal all the evidence, then this Court should refuse to consider the
239599_1
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issue. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). The
Court should "give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses," and not set aside a challenged finding unless it is determined to be
clearly erroneous. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2.

Whether the trial court'sfinding,that inheritance funds as well as

proceeds from the sale of Appellee's Carbon County property are not marital
property, is clearly erroneous when the funds were; (1) given to Appellee personally
from his mother and (2) received as proceeds from the sale of an individually owned
home, (3) placed in a separate bank account, and (4) used to purchase and make
improvements to two homes.
Appellant provides an incorrect standard of review for this issue. Appellant
couches the issue as one of a division of marital property, however, this is actually a
question of findings of fact. The issue presented by Appellant is whether the inheritance
funds and funds from the sale of a pre-marital home should be included as part of the
marital estate. This is essentially the same issue as the first; i.e. whether the funds were
traceable and identifiable, or whether they were consumed or lost their identity through
commingling. Accordingly, the issue should be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous"
standard.
Pursuant to well settled law in Utah, the trial court made two separate
determinations. First, under its findings of fact, the trial court determined whether the
property was separate or marital property. This is a question of fact, and must be
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Second, the court equitably divided the
239599.1
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marital property. If the issue were a question of whether the division of marital assets
was proper, then the standard of review would be one of "abuse of discretion." However,
the issue as presented and argued by Appellant is one of determining whether property
should have been classified as separate or marital.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND COURT RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1999). Disposition of property (1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A.. ..Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married on August 26, 1983 and separated in approximately
April 1997. Mr. Arnason filed for divorce on or about May 5, 1997. This is an appeal of
the findings of fact and resulting division of marital property entered by The Honorable
Frank G. Noel, Third District Judge.
Prior to the marriage, Mr. Arnason owned a home in Carbon County. He sold that
home in 1996 for $21,000, and used $20,000 to pay down the mortgage on a home in
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Sandy they purchased that same year. The trial court found that the home, as well as the
proceeds therefrom were premarital property. The court found that $20,000 of the
proceeds had been neither consumed nor lost their identity, and accordingly awarded that
to Mr. Amason.
Additionally, Mr. Amason also received inheritance funds as well as funds from a
partnership which included his mother and all her children. These funds were given to
Mr. Amason individually, and not to both parties. Approximately six months after the
parties marriage, Mr. Amason purchased a home for $45,000 using funds he had received
from his mother. Extensive improvements, which cost approximately $29,000 were
made to the home which were paid for by Mr. Amason from funds received directly from
his mother.
Finally, in 1996, the parties purchased a home in Sandy with money from a
separate bank account held exclusively by Mr. Amason, which included inheritance and
partnership funds received from his mother. After finding that these funds were given as
gifts to Mr. Amason personally, and that the funds had neither been consumed nor lost
their identity through commingling, the trial court then used its discretion to divide the
remaining marital property equitably. Ms. Arnason, appeals those findings and the
resulting division of marital property.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

Appellee David Arnason and Appellant Beverly Sue Arnason were married

on August 26,1983. The parties became increasingly estranged during the course of their
marriage, and separated in approximately April 1997. See Record at 227, p. 10.
2.

Appellee is a beneficiary of the Fern F. Arnason Family Trust, which

consists of money saved by Appellee's mother and late father (the "inheritance" funds).
Appellee also receives funds from the Arnason Family Partnership, which is a partnership
between Appellee's mother and Appellee and his siblings. From 1982-1996, Appellee
received approximately $130,246 from the trust and partnership (these funds are referred
to in this brief as Appellee's "inheritance"). These funds were provided to Appellee by
checks from his mother. Record at 227, p. 78, In. 16-24; p. 79, In. 16-25; p. 80, In. 1-16;
p. 48, In. 12-22.
3.

Approximately six months after getting married, in February 1984, the

parties purchased a home in Salt Lake City (the Salt Lake" home), which was the family
home prior to purchasing the Sandy home in 1996. The majority of the funds for the Salt
Lake home came from Appellee's inheritance funds, money received either prior to the
marriage or at the beginning of marriage from Mr. Arnason's mother. Additionally, the
extensive costs for improvements made to the Salt Lake home were all paid with
inheritance funds as well. The funds were given by check to Mr. Arnason from his
mother and then disbursed to the contractors. The total of these payments on the home
from inheritance funds was $74,807 (consisting of $ 45,000 purchase price and $ 29,807
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for improvements). Record at 227, p. 9, In. 15-18; p. 26, In. 15-22; p. 52, In. 10-12; p. 28,
In. 6-11; p. 31, In. 24-25; p. 32, In. 1-4, 17-25.
4.

In about June of 1996, less than a year prior to their divorce the parties

purchased a home in Midvale (the "Sandy" home). Appellee made a $47,527.00 down
payment on the home using inheritance funds. Record at 227, p. 26, In. 15-20; p. 28, In.
6-11. The money used for the down payment came from checks received by Appellee
from his mother and which were placed directly into an individual credit union account.
Record at 227, p. 28, In. 15.
5.

Mr. Arnason owned a home in Carbon County, which he purchased before

his marriage to Appellant. Mr. Arnason purchased the home in the late 1970's and lived
in it until 1983. Mr. Arnason owned the Carbon County home free and clear of any liens
prior to the marriage. The home sold in 1996 for $21,000.00, $20,000.00 of which was
used to pay for the Sandy home. Record at 227, p. 29, In. 5-6, p. 11-15; 70, In. 25; 71,
ln.l.
6.

From 1993 on, both parties had their own bank accounts as well, to which

the other did not have access. Record at 227, p. 28 In. 13-15; p. 85, In. 10-12.
7.

Mr. Arnason filed for divorce on or about May 5, 1997. Appellant filed an

answer and counterclaim in June 1997. A trial was held on April 19,1999 before the
Honorable Frank G. Noel, Third District Judge. Pursuant to the trial, a decree of divorce
was granted and entered on May 19, 1999. Record at 227, p. 141, In. 11-15.
8.

The trial court found that "Petitioner [Appellee] received gifts and

inheritance from his parent's estate and from his parent's trust and partnership which
239599_1
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funds were separated by him into his own account and were used for down payment on
his home in Sandy, Utah, and for down payment and major improvement on the home of
the parties in Salt Lake City, Utah and for the purchase of Novell common Stock."
Record at 211,119.
9.

The trial court also found that the "funds were not commingled in any form

with marital funds or funds of Respondent [Appellant]." Findings of Fact and Record at
211,119.
10.

The trial court found that the source of the funds used to purchase the

homes and the stock "was identifiable and was traceable to the investments made which
characterized the funds as separate assets of Petitioner and not marital assets of the
parties." Record at 212,120.
11.

The trial court found that the funds were not commingled and were separate

property of Petitioner. Record at 212, f 20.
12.

The trial court found that Petitioner received $20,000 from the sale of his

premarital property (the Carbon County home) which was used to pay down the principal
due on the mortgage of the Sandy, Utah home, and that those funds were separate
property of the Petitioner, and not marital property. Record at 212, f 21.
13.

The trial court found that the amount of Petitioner's separate interest in the

home, valued at $130,000, which was directly traceable to his inheritance funds was
$74,807.00. Record at 213,123.
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14.

The trial court found that Respondent's claim as to the intent of Petitioner

at the time the funds were invested in the two properties and the stock was not
determinative. Record at 212, <][ 20.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant's entire appeal depends on whether the trial court's findings that the
inheritance funds, partnership funds, and the proceeds from the sale of the premarital
property are clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence. They are not,
therefore Appellant's appeal fails.
It is well settled law that a court must first determine whether property is separate
or marital, and second, divide the marital property equitably. The trial court did just that.
It found that the funds Mr. Arnason received from his mother and his deceased father's
estate were in fact separate funds. This was a proper finding which was supported by the
evidence presented at trial. The evidence presented at trial showed that the money
received by Mr. Arnason came from savings of his mother and his now-deceased father.
Other money given directly and solely to Mr. Arnason came from the family trust and the
family partnership. These funds were given to Mr. Arnason individually, and were
deposited in Mr. Arnason's credit union account, which was an exclusive account for
himself. The funds were not co-mingled with marital property to such an extent that they
lost their identity, nor were they consumed. In fact, the court specifically found that the
inheritance funds were identifiable and traceable to the current real property and stock.
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While Appellant suggests the trial court improperly failed to consider evidence
regarding Mr. Arnason's intent to use the inheritance funds, to the contrary, the court
simply held that the intent at the time of purchase of the home was not determinative.
Clearly the court considered all the evidence provided. Case law from this Court, the
Utah Supreme Court, and courts from other jurisdictions show that there are numerous
factors which should be considered when deciding whether a spouse's separate property
has become part of the marital estate. There is no conclusive evidence that Mr. Arnason
intended or in fact made a gift of his separate property to the marital estate. The court
properly held that the inheritance funds as well as the funds from the pre-marital home
were separate and therefore not part of the marital estate. Based on those findings, the
court subsequently divided equitably the assets of the marital estate.
The trial court followed Utah law in awarding the parties their equitable share in
the marital estate. As stated above, the trial court made findings of fact as to what
constituted separate property and what constituted marital property and then divided the
marital properly evenly. Utah law presumes that each party is entitled to fifty percent of
the value of the marital estate. There is absolutely no evidence that the trial court abused
its discretion when it divided the marital estate equally among the parties.
The Carbon County home was also deemed to be Mr. Arnason's separate property.
It was owned entirely by Mr. Arnason prior to the marriage, and when it was sold in
1996, the proceeds were placed in his separate bank account. Subsequently, a majority of
those proceeds from the sale of the home were traceable to a $20,000 payment on the
Sandy home. Accordingly, the court awarded that portion of the Sandy home to Mr.
239599_1
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Amason as separate property. Furthermore, the down payment on the Sandy home,
purchased in 1996, came from inheritance funds which were given solely to Mr. Amason
and placed in his individual bank account.
While it is possible for a spouse's separate property to be consumed or lose its
identity through commingling or gifts to the marital estate, the court specifically found
that no such commingling ever existed and that no gift was ever made to the marital
estate. The trial court properly considered the factors set forth under Utah law for
determining separate property, and based on the evidence presented at trial, found that the
funds from the Carbon County home as well as the inheritance funds were Mr. Arnason's
separate property. The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, therefore
the property division should be upheld.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLEE'S INHERITANCE FUNDS
WERE NOT COMMINGLED WITH MARITAL FUNDS IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS
A.

Courts Have the Power to Distribute Marital Property in Divorce
Proceedings,

The trial court is vested with the power to make distributions of marital property in
a divorce action. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1999). Prior to making that determination,
however, the trial court must first determine what constitutes marital property and what
constitutes separate property. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).
B.

Property Acquired by One Spouse by Gift and Inheritance During the
Marriage Should Be Awarded to That Spouse as Separate Property

There is a presumption that property acquired by one spouse by gift and
inheritance during marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) is that spouse's
separate property. See Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("As a
general rule, equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought
into the marriage.") (citations omitted); see also Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304,
308 (Utah 1988). However, property acquired by gift and inheritance during marriage
may become marital property under certain circumstances. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308.
If by her efforts or expense the other spouse has "contributed to the enhancement
maintenance, or protection of that property," a spouse may acquire an equitable interest
in it. Id. at 309 (citations omitted). Also, the property may become part of the marital
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estate if "the property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling," or
where "the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse."
Id. (citing Jeperson v. Jeperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) (wherein the court affirmed a
property division by which the value of one spouse's separate property was paid from the
equity in the marital home prior to a division of the remaining equity)). Here, the trial
court made specific findings that (1) the inheritance funds and family partnership funds
came personally to Mr. Arnason, (2) the funds were identifiable and traceable to the
equity in the homes, and (3) they were neither consumed nor lost their identity through
commingling or gift to the marital estate. These findings were not clearly erroneous.
C.

In Order to Overrule the Findings, The Court of Appeals Must Find that the
Trial Court's Findings are Clearly Erroneous,

The trial court's determinations, that the inheritance funds as well as those from
the sale of the Carbon County home are separate property, constitute findings of fact. See
Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424 ("To permit appellate review of the trial court's property
distribution.. .the distribution must be based upon adequate factual findings."). In
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the court stated that
upon reviewing a court's findings, "we will give due regard 'to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,' and we do not set aside a challenged
finding except when we determine it to be clearly erroneous." Id. at 603 (citation
omitted). The Schaumberg court followed the provisions of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which states in part, "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
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shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." Also, "[a] finding of fact will be found clearly erroneous when it is contrary
to the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court has a 'definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 354 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (further citations omitted).
In order to properly challenge findings of the trial court, the appellant "must
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial courts findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re Estate ofBartell 116
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); See also Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73,
79 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
The court "will uphold the trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to appropriately
marshal all of the evidence." Allredv. Brown, 893 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(cited in Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (wherein the court
upheld the trial court's ruling because the Appellant "had not properly marshaled the
evidence but had merely recited the findings on point and then highlighted the evidence
which he deems contrary to the findings.").
Appellant's brief in no way meets the standard set forth in Bartell. Indeed, though
it fails to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, Appellant's brief
in fact sets forth a substantial amount of support for the trial court's findings that the
funds were identifiable and traceable, and that they were neither commingled nor gifted
239599_1
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to the marital estate. Appellant barely attempts to marshal the evidence supporting the
trial court's decision, and then simply reasserts the same evidence and arguments which
were rejected at trial.
D.

The Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Finding that the Inheritance Funds
Were Neither Consumed nor Lost Their Identity

The trial court properly found that Mr. Arnason did not commingle his Inheritance
funds with marital property. In its findings of fact and conclusions of lawr the trial court
unequivocally stated that the "funds were not commingled in any form with marital funds
or funds of Respondent [Appellant]." Record at 211, ^[ 19. The court also found that
The source of the funds used was identifiable and was traceable to the
investments made which characterized the funds as separate assets of
Petitioner [Appellee] and not marital assets of the parties. The funds were
not commingled and are determined to be separate property interests of
Petitioner [Appellee].
Record at 212, f 20. Appellant cannot sustain her burden and show that these findings of
fact are so unsupported by the evidence that they are against the clear weight of the
evidence and therefore clearly erroneous.
1.

The Funds are Clearly Mr. Arnason's

As stated in Mortensen, the courts should "generally award property acquired by one
spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to
that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value..." Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. It is undisputed that the funds at issue were at least at one point the
separate property of Mr. Arnason. The inheritance funds provided to Appellee consist of funds
from the Fern F. Arnason Family Trust. See Record at 227, p. 78-79. Other funds came directly

239599.1

14

to Mr. Arnason from the Arnason Family Partnership, which is a partnership between Fern
Arnason and her children. See Record at 227 p. 79, In. 16-25; 80, In. 1-16. Fern Arnason gave
$126,100.00 to Mr. Arnason from the trust and the partnership from 1982 through 1996. See
Record at 227, p. 79, In. 1-5, 22-24; p. 80, In. 8-10. All funds were distributed to Mr. Arnason
individually and separately, and not to the parties jointly nor to Appellant. See Record at 227, p.
78, In. 16-25; p. 79, In. 1-3,19-24; p. 80, In. 8-16. The "vast majority" of the property was
deposited in Appellee's individual account. See Record at 49, In. 12-22.
2.

The fact that inheritance money was used to purchase homes used by
the family does not conclusively establish that the funds were
consumed or their identity lost

The property was clearly Mr. Arnason's separate property at one time, therefore
the Appellant must show that the finding that the assets were not commingled was clearly
erroneous. As set forth in Mortensen, a party's property may become marital property if
it "has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." Mortensen,
760 P.2d at 308. Based on the evidence before the court, it found that the property had
not been consumed nor had it lost its identity.
In this case, Mr. Arnason testified that he made a down payment of $47,527 on the
Sandy home. These funds came from Appellee's mother's estate. See Record at 28, In.
6-11. Mr. Arnason received these funds though checks that he deposited in his credit
union account. Id. In. 13-15. This account was an exclusive account in the name of Mr.
Arnason only. Id. None of the inheritance funds used for the down payment on the
Sandy home were earned by either of the parties. In Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah
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Ct. App. 1990) this court affirmed a trial court's award where the trial court found that
the proceeds from the sale of the marital home would be divided evenly only after the
value of the land given to one of the parties prior to marriage was given to that party.
The court accordingly affirmed a determination that part of the marital home was
separate property and part was marital property. Similarly, in Humphreys v. Humphreys,
520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme Court held it proper to remove the separate
property portion of the family home prior to dividing equally the marital portion. The
court said, "it is our conclusion that plaintiffs $3,400, which was used as a down
payment to purchase their family home, should be reimbursed to her..." Id. at 196. The
evidence showed that the $3,400 was money she received from the sale of a previously
owned home. Id. See also Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) (holding
that wife was properly credited with inheritances used to purchase homes); Preston v.
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982) (holding that the husband should have been credited
with his $9,310.93 contribution to the jointly owned cabin from assets owned prior to the
marriage); and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (holding that the
trial court properly granted spouse the amount of her contribution to the home, and
stating, "[ajlthough the home was held in joint tenancy, that is not conclusive that a gift
has been made."). In Jesperson, the parties during their marriage owned three different
mobile homes, including the one that had been purchased by the plaintiff prior to
marriage. Id. The court found that the mobile home and lot had been purchased for
$19,027, "which was contributed from Plaintiffs separate funds..." The home had
gained value during the marriage, and therefore the court awarded the plaintiff the
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amount she had contributed from separate property, hi The court then properly divided
the remaining equity in the home which was lound to be marital property

]

.. - :>. •'

I Ins is t'Uttly wli.il Ilk1 i uuiiI iiiliiii! nil llnk present i as*1 Inliriil.im v funds .ind p.irlnrrship
funds wer- -iv-m individually to Mr. Arnason. Those 'funds were placed into his separate
account, and thee used to purchase the Sandy home. See Record at 227, p. 31 , In 24-25;
P ,„.

:
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held thai tin ni<nwy \uid h\ Mi

\\ n.i1 »n < as ti aceable to till z

nld receive that money upon the sale oi uic home. See Record at
211. The trial court's findings are based upon the evidence presentedb> the ponies at
*~~! Each party had an opportunity to te^tilv a* ^v. U U^ vlr. Arnason ^ nu-i-,

^

*.^,

are not so lacking in support as to be against tiie clear weight oi the evidence,
••••iking them "clearly erroneous " m-

3.

n.»re. the Court should uphold those findings of

Evidence that some of the funds were deposited in a joint checking
account for a short period of time does not establish commingling

ni in,1 laci iiiiii sunn,1 in unit/* i no, KS pjm iinin mi m I in " mason miinIm\ niiiiiii11 in iiih
mother were put into a joint checking account for a period of tiinw <uw^ nut necessitate
the finding that the funds were consumed or its identity lost, In fad. simply because a
couple has property in a joint account does not necessaiil) mean it has become par I: of the •
marital estate

A\ '.tiovi n ilttnr, the men1 (,nl lh.il m I n HUH1 is muied h\ lllnifh spouses dors

not mean that the individual funds used to purchase that home have been consumed or
lost their identity As stated by the court in Jesperson i \ Jesperson, "Although the home
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was held in joint tenancy, that is not conclusive that a gift has been made." Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d at 328. Similarly, in Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) the Court held that a trial court properly awarded husband money which had been
put into a bank account prior to marriage. In Udy, the Ms. Udy argued that it was error
for the court to award Mr. Udy money as separate property, however the court of appeals
upheld the finding of separate property. Consistent with these cases, the court in this case
held that the simple fact that the checks from Mr. Amason's mother to Mr. Arnason were
deposited for a brief period of time in a joint checking account is not conclusive that a
gift to the marital estate has been made, nor that the funds had been consumed nor lost
their identity.
4.

The money used to purchase and remodel the Salt Lake home came from
Mr. Amason's mother

The court held that the funds used to purchase and remodel the Salt Lake home
were traceable from Mr. Amason's mother to Mr. Amason and then to the Salt Lake
home. Approximately six months after the couple married, they purchased the Salt Lake
home for $45,000.00, the majority of which came from Mr. Amason's mother. Record at
227, p. 30, In. 1-4; p. 31, In. 24-25; p. 32, In. 1-4. Furthermore, when asked where the
funds used for all of the improvements of the home came from, Mr. Amason testified,
"All of those came from my mother." Record at 32, In. 17-19. And when asked what it
meant that they came from his mother, Mr. Arnason testified, "Checks from her estate
which she made in my name and then I disbursed them to the contractors/' Record at
227, p. 32 In. 20-22. No contrary evidence was provided. Based on this unopposed
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testimony, the court found that the money for the down payment and improvements to the
property were identifiable a ml I U U M M I 1 lo lli< Sail 1 ,ike Ilonn

, \\i\'n II.mi ttitVivd no •

iilrsiinioiiv Imi show that the funds had been either consumed or lost their idei*n V .
5.

' None of the evidence of" commingling cited by Appellant is persuasive
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-epanie property interests of Petitioner [Appellee]." Record at ^12. f 20 The testing—
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a^cu iu pui chase the Salt Lake home. Next, 'the

testimony is clear that all money for the remodeling and further construction on the Salt
T „i_ hrrnc came directh iiuin -

Arnason's mother which was then disbursed b> IV li
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p i a c e c | i n to the joint checking account prior" to disbui sement to the contractors; however,
any time the funds spent in the joint account is negligible. ^.
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owned the homes. that they were purchased during the marriage of the parties, and that he
didn i affirmative!} intend to keep part of the proceeds or the value of the homes from,, the
A
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to make a gift of his funds received from inheritance to the marital estate. In fact, the
evidence clearly shows that the vast majority of those funds were kept in a separate bank
account, exclusively controlled by Appellee.
Next, Appellant suggests that the fact that a portion of Appellee's paycheck was
deposited into the same credit union account that contained his inheritance funds suggests
commingling of marital funds. Further, Appellant states that money from the credit
union account was used to pay for a car which was used for family obligations and family
matters. Relying on this, Appellant argues that this means that funds used for marital
purposes were commingled with the inheritance funds. Appellant's brief is misleading
and fails to marshal the evidence on this point which supports the trial court's finding.
The court correctly found that the only money deposited from Mr. Arnason's paycheck
into the credit union account was the amount necessary to pay the loan on the car. At the
conclusion of the trial the court stated,
The only family expenses that were paid out of that account with the credit
union was the payment on the car. It was amounts taken out of Mr.
Arnason's check to pay a loan with that credit union. Other than that the
money that was in that account was used primarily, if not exclusively, for
the down payments on the homes and to receive that money that was given
to Mr. Arnason by his mother.
Record at 227, p. 142, In. 9-16. Mr. Arnason's testimony supports this finding. During
trial the court asked, "How much was taken out of your paycheck each month to go into
that account?" Whereupon Mr. Arnason answered, "Well, I'm not sure exactly it was for
the car payment which was 400 and something, the Buick Park Avenue, the '88." Record
at 227, p. 56, In. 4-8. Thus, the only money from the credit union account which was
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used to for family expenses was an amount which came from Mr, Amason's paycheck
and was used to pay the automobile *
linally, in ail altciiipl toestabliJi ili.il \w lund. \ n1 - .riiinnjjlul, Apprllaiil
ivlii.^ i M i" *'M'i "> i1 M1' \ mason did not soeci
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marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to 'that spouse, together with any
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.-. in iaci, die cases cited above,

....wijin the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal- u;"~:;nvd a iri.il courts determination
that separate funds used to purchase marital 1 lomes or other family property, suggest that
lln pu sumpliuii i' Iiiul llic squr.ilr Iumi1 IIIMMI in pun lusv u lininc ivnmin sppiiuli1
p,i< iptTt y. None of those cases state that the p-*rtv making the down payment with
inheritance funds had the specific intent at the time of the purchases to keep the property
squiak
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Appellant's burden to show that the funds were consumed or lost their identity
Appellant, did not sustain this burden.
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Arnason by his mother and was used as a down payment and as contribution toward the
purchase of the homes." Record at 227 p. 141, In. 24-25; p. 142, In. 1-3. There is
sufficient and substantial evidence upon which the trial court based its findings. This
Court should accordingly uphold the trial court's findings of fact regarding separate and
marital property.
II.

APPELLEE MADE NO GIFT TO THE MARITAL ESTATE OF HIS
INHERITANCE FUNDS OR PROCEEDS FROM SELLING HIS CARBON
COUNTY PROPERTY, THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
REFUSED TO INCLUDE THE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS IN ITS DIVISION
OF PROPERTY
Appellant's second argument assumes that Appellee made a gift to the marital

estate of his inheritance funds and proceeds from selling his Carbon County property.
The entire argument relies on this assumption being correct. However, this assumption is
contrary to the findings of fact of the court. Unless Appellant overcomes the high burden
of proving that the court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, this court need not
even address the second argument regarding division of property. Appellant's contention
is merely that the court's division of property is inequitable, and is based on the
assumption that the trial court incorrectly categorized the property as separate.
Appellant made no argument above that the proceeds from the sale of the Carbon
County home were marital property, nor did she marshal the evidence used by the court
to support its finding that the proceeds from the Carbon County home were Mr.
Arnason's separate property. Appellant's second argument simply assumes, contrary to
the evidence, that the proceeds from the Carbon County property were a gift to the
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marital, estate. The uncontested findings of fact state that Petitioner used $20,000 from
the sale of his premarital property located in Carbon County to pay down the mortgage
on llir .sandy huiin

" Inn h luiuN .111' Iniiwl II In1 srpai.Hr pntpi i l \ ml IVtitionn

|App* l h r | ;m<l :ii" i»ol marital proprrfv." Record at 212, f 2 x . xm, *x**~mg was basc=

the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Arnason who stated that he owned the property free
and clear prior to the marriage, and which was soid ;*>; ;:zi,uuu i;
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EVEN IF THE COURT USES AN ABUSE OF D I S C R E T I Q N STANDARD, THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE
INHERITANCE AND PARTNERSHIP FUNDS. AS WELL AS THE PROCEEDS
FROM THE CARBON COUNTY HOME WERE SEPARPATE PROPERTY OF
MR, ARNASON
~--( e property has been found to be marital funds by a court, the court then has
-w^n ;•.'.

- ..

.. property

^

'|T|

properlvc \K^HW

'henarties -• ^r^ :r r ut of the marital estate or as separate

pi

ic niner.
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Dunn i \ -v - SfT r : * 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).'

The * \iurt of \ppeais generally requires detailed tindings as to llic clussilicdluni of
Haumont, 793 P 2d 421 (I Jtaii Ct App 1990).
Thus, the issue of whether the marital estate was proper!) • divid = • I : ill) arises if the Court
finds that the findings of fact of the trial court were clearly erroneous.
A.

Ihe trial court did not abuse its discretion

V" "\- Xpivllani states that the argument is one of property division, the actual
;oo„o argued by Appellant appears to the same as in the previous argument: whether the
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findings that the inheritance funds and proceeds of the Carbon County home were
correctly found to be separate property of Appellee or whether they were commingled to
such a degree that they lost their identity and became part of the marital estate. The
argument and case law set forth in the preceding section are sufficient to show that the
trial court's findings were correct. However, even under an abuse of discretion standard,
the findings of the trial court should not be overturned.
1.

Appellee's inheritance funds are separate property

Appellant relies on a statement by the trial court regarding Appellee's intent, in an
attempt to prove that the court incorrectly found the inheritance funds to be separate. The
court stated at the end of the trial that the intent at the time of purchase of the property
was not crucial to its finding. Record at 227 p. 142, In. 19-25. While the court did make
this statement, it did not say that it failed to take intent into account. As cited above,
there are numerous cases in which a party contributed separate funds to a marital property
and upon divorce, the court granted them the amount of that separate contribution prior to
dividing the remainder of the equity in the property. Appellee does not dispute that intent
is one factor that should be considered upon determining whether property is separate or
marital. Appellant attempts, however, to use intent as the conclusive factor.
None of the cases cited by Appellant from other jurisdictions are dispositive, nor
are they even helpful in this instance. Those cases describe a variety of circumstances
where a court found that funds had been commingled or lost their identity and
consequently became part of the marital estate. Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, 325
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Appellant's other citations merely state that it is possible for inherited or other
irate property to become marital propr-: \ That principle has already been set forth
• Utah Supicnic t ouil in ii«'i^ ;.:
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mi iiili i! i in in I il ippi\ils * use in re Mtin ' tv - of Finer, 920, P.2d 325, 332 (Colo. App,
1990J, io support her position which, however. ^ Acml) distinguishable. In Feiner, the
husband, testified that he put the properties in joint tenancy in ordei to pi o vide assets to

however, no such intent was expressed by Mi Arnason. In another case cited by
Appt IliJiiii, In re Marria ge ofMeisner, 715 P.2d 1273 (Colo. App. 1985), the Colorado
cnurtof appeals aliirmed a trial cowl r> I hidings thai piupri(> W w iiiiiiii.il kiM/tl (nilli

i

the finding h\ tin1 tun! i \\\\\\ lh:)t the husband's intent in purchasing share was to make a
J
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was not crucial, and that the property was not commingled or gifted to the marriage.
I'm.iiU n fiMin/ihiip v limns "I l \ V 'd 96, 99 (Alaska I'Wfi), nUii/nl in '\ppoll;ml lor the
pi incipal that property acquired can become marital r
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divorce.
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The cases cited by Appellant effectively show what was set forth in Mortensen:
that separate funds may become marital funds through commingling, exchanges, or plain
intent to give a gift of the property to the marital estate. They do not, however, show that
the trial court in this case erred in determining that the inheritance funds received by Mr.
Aranson were at the beginning and remained his separate property. Mr. Aranson did not
commingle his inheritance funds. There is no clear evidence suggesting that the property
was so commingled as to lose is identity or become untraceable. Only the inheritance
funds, which were used to purchase the Salt Lake home, were placed in a joint account.
Even then, those funds did not become so commingled that they were untraceable or
unidentifiable. Additionally, testimony at trial established that the funds used for
improvements to the home were received from Mr. Arnason's mother and then
distributed to the contractors.
Appellant's cites to Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 535-36 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), and Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 849-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) are
inapplicable because in both those cases the court found that cash gifts had been given to
both the husband and Wife jointly, and not to one party separately.
Case law appears to hold that Utah courts will not allow property to remain
separate where it has been consumed. See Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304. If Appellee had
actually used the funds to rent a home, or to pay for the daily living expenses, then the
court arguably would not be able to award those funds to Appellee prior to an equitable
division of the remaining property. That, however, is not the issue in the instant case.
Here Appellee invested his funds into properties which maintained their value, and in fact
239599J
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increased in value, rhe identity of those funds was not lost, nor were those fu^Js
consumed. Their value is traceable and remains to this day in the ^and> and t u ;>a;t
I ,ake homes, The trial court, pursuant to settled
ApiH'lli.v ill*1
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" " " "act, here the proceeds were first plnrrd

in Mr. Arnason's separate bank account, and then used to pay down the mortgage on the
Sandy home.
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) is factually similar to the
instant case. In both cases, one party owned a home prior to marriage. Id. In both cases
the separate home was sold and the proceeds were applied to a new marital home. Id.
And in both cases, the court awarded the donating party the value of their separate
investment in the home prior to dividing the remainder of the equity as marital property.
Id. In accordance with Humphreys v. Humphreys, the trial court's finding that the
proceeds were separate property was not erroneous.
In the present case, the Carbon County home was sold for $21,000, $1,000 of
which had been consumed or lost it's identity through use on expenses of the household
and was therefore not awarded to Mr. Arnason. The trial court acted properly in
awarding Appellee those funds which it found to be separate property of the Appellee.
CONCLUSION
The trial court had two tasks in dividing the property: the first was to make
findings as to whether the property was marital, or whether it was separate; the second
task was to then divide the property from the marital estate equitably. The trial court
committed no error in finding that the inheritance funds, as well as the funds from the
sale of the Carbon County home, were the separate property of Mr. Arnason and not
marital property. The court properly found that no gift had been made of those marital
funds, nor had they been commingled with the marital funds. Those funds were received
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from j ^ s mother. The court found that those funds were identifiable and

traceable to the two homes and stocks purchased by Mr. Arnason
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M. Byron Fisher, A1082
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801)531-8900
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANTHONY DAVID ARNASON,
Petitioner,

)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)
)
)

BEVERLY SUE ARNASON,

)

No. 974901978DA

)

Judge Frank G. Noel

Respondent.

This matter came for trial before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge,
presiding on April 19, 1999. The parties were present and were represented by their legal
counsel of record. More than ninety days have passed since the filing of the Complaint herein.
The parties have complied with the statutory requirements of attendance at parenting class and
of providing verification of income and filing child support worksheets. The parties presented
testimony and evidence. Legal counsel for the parties presented argument as to issues of law
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and fact, and the court, having reviewed all pleadings, the evidence, testimony and the law
presented and being fully advised now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent are and for more than three months prior to the

filing of this Complaint have been actual and bona fide residents of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
2.

The parties hereto are husband and wife, having been married in Salt Lake

City, Utah on August 26, 1983.
3.

There have been three children bom as issue of this marriage, Andrea

Amason, bom August 7,1984, now age 14, Cassandra Amason, bom November 9, 1987, now
age 11, and Troy Alexander Amason, bom August 26, 1990, now age 8.
4.

For many months prior to the separation of the parties in April, 1997, the

parties have experienced many differences, which have become irreconcilable, including
Respondent commencing a relationship with another man. There are good and sufficient
grounds for granting of divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
5.

Petitioner is a fit and proper person and should be awarded the legal care,

custody and control of the three minor children, Petitioner should be awarded possessory
custody of Andrea and Troy and Petitioner should be their primary care provider. The parties
should be awarded joint possessory custody of Cassandra. The child should be in the custody of
Respondent overnight and in the custody of Petitioner during the day except for the statutory
visitation periods.
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6.

Respondent should be awarded reasonable visitation with the minor children

and should have at least statutory minimum visitation rights as provided in Sections 30-3-35,
U.C., 1997, and additional visitation as the children and the parties may agree and as may be in
the best interests of the children. In addition to joint possessory custody of Cassandra,
Petitioner should be awarded statutory visitation rights with Cassandra as to weekday evenings,
weekends, holidays, special holidays and extended summer visitation periods.
7.

The Statutory Advisory Guidelines, Section 30-3-33 U.C., 1997, and the

provisions for special circumstances, Section 30-3-36 U.C. 1997, and the provisions as to
relocation, Section 30-3-37 U.C, 1997, should apply. Copies of these statutes are attached for
assistance of the parties.)
8.

The Court specifically finds that the parties are equally bonded to the minor

children, that Petitioner has been the primary care provider for the three minor children for the
past two years since the separation of the parties, that Petitioner can provide a more stableenvironment for the children in that Respondent maintains a relationship with a man outside of
marriage and has demonstrated a use and acquiescence to the use of marijuana which is not a
proper environment for the minor children. The Court alsofindsthat the minor child,
Cassandra, has resided half time with Respondent since October, 1998 and that this arrangement
has been satisfactory for the child. However, Petitioner should remain the responsible party for
continuing clinical psychiatric care for Cassandra and for the continuing of prescribed
medication. Petitioner should also continue as the responsible party for the schooling of
Cassandra, either under the present home school program or in private or pubic school.
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Petitioner should consult with Respondent as to the education and medical decisions concerning
Cassandra.
9.

Based upon the child support work sheets attached hereto, Respondent

should pay child support of $605.00 per month for the support of Andrea and Troy and $7.00
per month for the support of Cassandra and $75 per month as one-half of medical insurance •
premiums for the three minor children totaling child support of $687.00 per month commencing
April 19, 1999 and continuing thereafter until each child reaches 18 years of age, is emancipated
or graduates from high school in the normal course whichever should occur later.
10.

Child support of $687.00 per month should be paid pursuant to the statutory

child support guidelines and based on the income of the parties set forth in the child support
worksheet filed herein. One half of child support shall be due by the 5th and one half by the 20th
of each month.
11.

The parties have equitably divided their personal property, furniture and

furnishings including the furnishings and furniture of the minor children, and each should be
awarded the personal property now in their possession as their sole and separate property.
12- Petitioner should be awarded his 1988 Buick Park Avenue automobile and
he should be awarded his personal belongings as his sole and separate property.
13.

Each party should pay their own debts and obligations incurred in their own

name and should hold the other party harmless therefrom.
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14. Neither party should be awarded alimony herein. Both parties are fully
capable of providing for their own needs. Respondent's admitted cohabitation since separation
would foreclose any claim for alimony.
15. Petitioner should maintain health and accident insurance for the minor
children. Each party pay one-half of the actual medical insurance premiums, co-pay and
medical, dental, orthodontic and eye care expenses for the minor children not covered by
insurance.
16. Petitioner waives any interest, right or claim to any of the employment
claims of Respondent filed through the office of equal employment opportunity or through her
employer.
17. The parties waive the requirement of income withholding and respondent
should pay the child support directly to petitioner until further order of the Court.
18. Petitioner and Respondent should maintain their own life insurance policies
with the minor children of the parties as named beneficiaries thereof.
19. The Court finds that Petitioner received gifts and inheritance from his
parent's estate and from his parent's trust and partnership which funds were separated by him
into his own account and were used for down payment on his home in Sandy, Utah, and for
down payment and major improvement on the home of the parties in Salt Lake City, Utah and
for the purchase of Novell common stock. These funds were not commingled in any form with
marital funds or funds of Respondent.
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20. Respondent's claim as to the intent of Petitioner at the time the funds were
invested in the two properties and the stock is not determinative in this proceeding. The source
of the funds used was identifiable and was traceable to the investments made which
characterized the funds as separate assets of Petitioner and not marital assets of the parties. The
funds were not commingled and are determined to be separate property interests of Petitioner.
21. Petitioner received $20,000 in the sale of his premarital property located in
Carbon County, Utah, which funds were used to pay down the principal due on the mortgage of
the Sandy, Utah home which funds are found to be separate property of Petitioner and are not
marital property.
22. The real and personal property of the parties should be divided equitably
pursuant to Exhibit P-8 which follows:

Asset
1) Sandy Home awarded to
Petitioner
Appraised
Mortgage, $853.37 per month
Separate Down (Husband)
2) Salt Lake Home awarded to
Respondent
Appraised
Mortgage, $417.80 per month
Separate Down (Husband)

Marital Equity

205,000.00
(112,256.00)
( 47,527.00)
( 20,000.00)

84,076.00

4) 401k Retirement

48,233.00
6

Awarded to
Respondent

25,217.00

130,000.00
(14,864.00)
(74,807.00)

3) 401k Retirement
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Awarded to
Petitioner

40,329.00
74,807.00
84,076.00
48,233.00

5) IRA (Marital)

6,000.00

6) Stock Holdings (Novell)
Inheritance, Separate property
of Petitioner

Novell stock

7) 1988 Buick Park Avenue

1,800.00
Minimum

8) Personal Property

6,000.00

TOTALS

1,800.00
12.000.00
129,093.00

Difference

2.000.00
165, 369.00

36,276.00

Vi from Wife

18,138.00

Division

147.231.00

(18,138.00)
147.231.00

23. Petitioner is awarded judgment against Respondent and an equitable lien
against the Salt Lake City home in the amount of $92,945.00 being $74,807.00 as Petitioner's
separate interest in the home and $18,138.00 as the amount necessary to equalize the division of
assets between the parties. Judgment shall not accrue interest until the amount is due.
Respondent shall pay the amount of the judgment to Petitioner at the first occurrence of one of
the following events:
A. the minor child Cassandra is emancipated or reaches 18 years of age;
B. the home is sold;
C. the home is no longer used as Respondent's principal place of
residence;
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D. Respondent remarries;
E. Respondent cohabits with a person of the opposite sex.
After the date of occurrence of one of the above events, this judgment should accrue interest at
the legal rate until paid.
24.

Petitioner should be awarded additional judgment against Respondent for

$2,545.16 for temporary child support arrearages, medical insurance premiums due and medical
expenses of the minor children due through April 19, 1999.
25.

Petitioner's claim for lost rent on the Salt Lake City home is denied.

26.

The parties should cooperate in the execution of the documents, deeds,

conveyances or transfers necessary to effectuate the division of assets between the parties as set
forth herein.
27.

Each party should pay their own attorneys' fees and costs involved in this

28.

Petitioner should claim the oldest and youngest children as dependents for

proceeding.

income tax purposes. Respondent should claim the middle child as a dependent for income tax
purposes.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and for good cause appearing, upon
motion of plaintiffs counsel, the Court makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over

the parties and the minor children to this action.
158523.1
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2.

The parties have completed the required parenting class. (Certificates of

Completion are filed herein.
3.

The parties havefiledthe required verification of income.

4.

Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce from Respondent upon

the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final and absolute upon signing
and filing of the same in the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk.
5.

The Decree of Divorce granted to Petitioner should be in conformance

with the foregoing Finding^ of Fact.
DATED this

(£f

y

day of /WMsj

1999.
BY THE

District Judge
Approved as to Form:

avid Pauf
Attorney for Respondent
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